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Humanitarian assistanceIn 2011–12, Somalia experienced the worst famine of the twenty- first century. Since then, research on
the famine has focused almost exclusively on the external response, the reasons for the delay in the inter-
national response, and the implications for international humanitarian action in the context of the ‘‘glo-
bal war on terror.” This paper focuses on the internal, Somali response to the famine. Themes of
diversification, mobility and flexibility are all important to understanding how people coped with the
famine, but this paper focuses on the factor that seemed to determine whether and how well people sur-
vived the famine: social connectedness, the extent of the social networks of affected populations, and the
ability of these networks to mobilize resources. These factors ultimately determined how well people
coped with the famine. The nature of reciprocity, the resources available within people’s networks,
and the collective risks and hazards faced within networks, all determined people’s individual and house-
hold outcomes in the famine and are related to the social structures and social hierarchies within Somali
society. But these networks had a distinctly negative side as well—social identity and social networks
were also exploited to trap humanitarian assistance, turn displaced people into ‘‘aid bait,” and to a large
degree, determined who benefited from aid once it started to flow. This paper addresses several ques-
tions: How did Somali communities and households cope with the famine of 2011 in the absence of
any state-led response—and a significant delay in a major international response? What can be learned
from these practices to improve our understanding of famine, and of mitigation, response and building
resilience to future crises?
 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In 2011–12, Somalia experienced the worst famine of the
twenty-first century. Since then, research on the famine has
focused almost exclusively on the external response, the reasons
for the delay in the international response, and the implications
for international humanitarian action in the context of the ‘‘global
war on terror.” This paper focuses on the internal, Somali response
to the famine. How did Somali communities and households cope
with the famine of 2011 in the absence of any state-led response—
and a significant delay in a major international response? What
can be learned from these practices to improve our understanding
of famine, and of mitigation, response and building resilience to
future crises?
Themes of diversification, mobility and flexibility are important
in understanding how people coped, but this paper focuses on the
factor that most determined how well people survived the famine:
social connectedness or ‘‘capital.” The nature of reciprocity, andespecially the resources available within people’s networks, and
the collective risks and hazards faced within networks, all deter-
mined people’s individual and household outcomes in the famine.
Many of these factors and dynamics are related to the social struc-
tures and social hierarchies within Somali society.
This paper briefly reviews the literature on famine ‘‘coping
strategies” and on ‘‘social capital.” Then it presents a synthesis of
evidence from research on the Somali famine of 2011 that apply
to a range of coping practices, highlighting the ways in which
social connections enabled people to survive, but also put certain
groups of people at much greater risk. Finally, the paper suggests
several working hypotheses incorporating the implications for the-
ory, policy, and practice.1ariety of
e sake of
ere tends
led down
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This paper is based on 260 narrative interviews on the famine
from the perspective of people most affected by it.2 These come
from interviews conducted in 2012–14 in Bay, Lower Shabelle,
Gedo, Middle Juba, Galgadud and Mudug regions, as well as in
Mogadishu, and in the refugee camps in Dollo-Ado, Ethiopia and
Dadaab, Kenya. A small number of additional interviews were also
conducted in Nairobi in the UK, with populations sending remit-
tances.3 The interviews noted clan identities and in all locations
other than displaced and refugee camps, purposively selected two
or three of the different clan or social groups in the local research
site.4 This analysis was informed by a grounded theory approach,5
but the interviews were framed in light of the anthropological liter-
ature on Somali society. Nevertheless, the interview questions
evolved over time and by location during the study, so direct quan-
titative comparisons or counting of emerging thematic trends is not
possible from this evidence. Conclusions here are framed as working
hypotheses about the nature of coping and social relations in Somali
society.
Conducting interviews with a sensitivity to social identity
allowed the analysis to differentiate trends in coping and survival
strategies among different social groups, including how commonly
remittances were received (from within the country and abroad),
how people described the way in which they called on relatives,
clan-members, or others in distant locations, how important hav-
ing relatives in urban areas or abroad was as a livelihood or sur-
vival factor. Analysis of patterns and differences within the same
area as well as across the whole sample population revealed the
major findings in this paper. This paper uses quotes from specific
individuals to illustrate these wider patterns and indicate how
some groups and/or households are very strongly connected
between rural, urban and diasporic locations; the extent of this
phenomenon is such that even respondents and who are not con-
nected in this way highlight a significant coping and survival strat-
egy for many people.
Somali social structure is highly complex and variable.6 As
Roland Marchal puts it, ‘‘history, migration and urbanisation . . . have
made each clan very distinct, even while they claim many common-
alities.”7 However, lineage identity is a powerful form of social soli-
darity, that includes sharing of resources, and is commonly invoked
through notions such as diya and qaraan—the latter as a collective
form of insurance payment in relation to conflict, the latter as a more
general intra-clan fund-raising system.8 It also provides the struc-
ture through which relationships can be identified and thereby assis-
tance requested. That said, others forms of relationship that can
generate assistance also exist, such as friendship, business relations
and religious affiliations. To the extent possible, all these processes2 Other interviews included people in refugee hosting communities in Kenya and
Ethiopia, as well as government and aid agency officials, which were not analyzed
here, except for general background.
3 A selection of these narratives have been compiled and briefly analyzed in a
separate and much longer paper. See Majid et al. ‘‘Narratives of Famine – Somalia
2011.” (Medford: Tufts University, 2016).
4 For example, in Luuq, we spoke to Marehan, Dir and Gabaweyne identity groups
and in Qorioley to Dubane/Jarer, Garre and Jiddo.
5 Jaber Gubrium et al., The Sage Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of
the Craft (New York: Sage, 2012).
6 Virginia Luling. ‘‘Genealogy as Theory, genealogy as tool: aspects of Somali ‘Cla
nship’.” Social Identities, 12(4): 471–485.
7 Roland Marchal. ‘‘Warlordism and Terrorism: How to Obscure an Already
Confusing Crisis? The Case of Somalia.” International Affairs, 83 no 6 (2016): p. 1098.
8 See I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the
Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa, London: James Currey (1961). Also see Cindy
Horst, Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps
of Kenya, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books (2006)and variations of the Somali social structure—as they functioned in
a crisis of the severity of 2011—were queried as components of inter-
views. Evidence from the interviews and multiple rounds of analysis
and triangulation with Somalis and Somali experts provide sufficient
confidence that working hypotheses regarding Somali social net-
works can be suggested.
While the importance of clan identity and its social connected-
ness came out as a significant factor in relation to social solidarity
and survival, it also provided the separation of identity that
allowed weaker groups, particularly the displaced who were pre-
dominantly the Rahanweyn and Jarer, to be preyed upon by more
powerful groups, into whose area they were moving.1.2. Background on the famine
The famine itself, which has been well documented elsewhere,9
resulted in the loss of an estimated 258,000 human lives.10 It was
triggered by drought and a major production failure, by a global
spike in the price of food that drastically reduced people’s purchas-
ing power at a time when local production had failed, and by an on-
going war. The lack of adequate preventive measures was at least in
part because a proscribed group controlled much of the affected
area, and counter-terrorism legal restrictions outweighed humani-
tarian concerns in external policy consideration.11 Both the control-
ling local authority (Al-Shabaab) and international donors put severe
restrictions on humanitarian action that could have prevented or
mitigated the crisis—and significantly delayed a major international
response. As a result, many affected groups were forced to deal with
the worsening crisis almost entirely using their own mechanisms
and social networks.
A large-scale crisis had been predicted as early as late-2010, but
not enough was done to mitigate the onset of the disaster. The evi-
dence suggests that the worst of the mortality had already peaked
by the time that the famine was declared.12 The declaration mobi-
lized a large-scale response by both Western and non-Western
humanitarian actors (primarily from Islamic donors and charities),
and combined with the return of the rains and a rapid reversal in
the high cost of food, brought the remaining mortality under control
by early 2012.13 But the major response was very late and the factors
just outlined prevented the response from reaching some of the
worst affected areas. Before the major international response (by
both Western and non-Western actors)14 reached affected groups,
they drew support from their own communities, their business
groups, their Diasporas, and their own neighbors and kin. This paper
briefly analyses these responses.9 See Daniel Maxwell and Nisar Majid, Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives,
Collective Failures, 2011–2012. (London and New York: Hurst Publishers/Oxford
University Press, 2016).
10 Francesco Checci and W. Courtland Robinson, ‘‘Mortality among Populations of
Southern and Central Somalia Affected by Severe Food Insecurity and Famine During
2010–2012,” (Rome/Washington, D.C.: FAO/FEWS NET, 2013).
11 For a detailed analysis of the famine as a whole, see Daniel Maxwell and Nisar
Majid, Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 2012–2012
(London: Hurst Publishers, 2016).
12 Checci and Robinson, ‘‘Mortality among Populations of Southern and Central
Somalia Affected by Severe Food Insecurity and Famine During 2010–2012.”
13 Numerous factors related to the course of the crisis, including a detailed analysis
of the causal and complicating factors; the ‘‘early warning/late response” phe-
nomenon; the role of Al-Shabaab and counter-terrorism restrictions in constraining
mitigation and response and numerous other issues are outlined in Maxwell and
Majid, Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 2012–2012.
14 The study also included focused research on the role and response of Islamic
actors (both donors and charities) but while many of these agencies responded to the
famine, we treated this as a different kind of intervention. See Daniel Maxwell and
Nisar Majid, Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 2011–12
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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2.1. Coping with famine and acute food insecurity
Research on coping with food security crisis can be traced back
to Amartya Sen’s seminal work on ‘‘entitlements.”15 Sen’s sugges-
tion that the process of entitlement failure could be mapped led to
considerable research on ‘‘coping strategies,” summarized by Corbett
in 1988.16 Michael Watts suggested that, as food access becomes
more constrained, households are more likely to employ less rever-
sible and more severe strategies, attempting to reduce short-term
threats to food access while maintaining the longer-term viability
of livelihoods.17
Other research in the area of coping and adaptation includes
work on the intensification of existing strategies, the diversification
of activities and migration in search of new opportunities.18 Migra-
tion has long been observed as a livelihood option in both the short
term and the long term, depending on labor demand between differ-
ent areas.19 As the costs of telecommunications and transportation
have declined, the connections between local communities and dis-
tant kin have increased. In some cases, transnational social networks
are such that people in different countries can be described as effec-
tively being part of the same ‘‘community.”20 Remittance income has
been repeatedly shown to be a small but significant factor in the
incomes of poor rural households. Migration to urban areas, and to
destinations outside of the country of origin are also a prominent
features of livelihood strategies.21 But coping with crisis also clearly
depends on the social networks or the social connectedness of
affected households and communities.
2.2. Social ‘‘capital” and social connectedness
Three major sources of empirical work helped to define social
capital.22 Bourdieu noted that social capital is ‘‘an aggregate of the
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a dur-
able network of a more or less institutionalized relationships or
mutual acquaintance or recognition”23—in other words, the network
of social ties that a person could access and the resources that could
then flow through them. Three forms of capital existed at the indi-
vidual level and were dependent of an individual’s social attributes,
his/her capacity to accumulate these types of capital, and the rele-15 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (New
York: Oxford University press, 1981).
16 Jane Corbett, ‘‘Famine and Household Coping Strategies,” World Development 16,
no. 9 (1988). Susanna Davies, Adaptable Livelihoods. Coping with Food Insecurity in the
Malian Sahel (London: MacMillan Press, 1996).
17 Michael J. Watts, Silent Violence: Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1983).
18 F. Ellis, Stephen Devereux, and P. White, Social Protection in Africa (Cheltenham,
UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2009); Frank Ellis, ‘‘Household Strategies
and Rural Livelihood Diversification,” The Journal of Development Studies 35, no. 1
(1998); Christopher McDowell and Arjan de Haan, ‘‘Migration and Sustainable
Livelihoods: A Critical Review of the Literature,” (Brighton: IDS, 1997).
19 ‘‘Migration and Sustainable Livelihoods: A Critical Review of the Literature.”
20 See Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo, The Anthropology of Globalization. A
Reader. (Blackwell Publishing, 2002: 19).
21 Anna Lindley, ‘‘The Early Morning Phone Call: Remittances from a Refugee
Diaspora Perspective: Working Paper No. 47,” (Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy
and Society, 2007); McDowell and de Haan, ‘‘Migration and Sustainable Livelihoods: A
Critical Review of the Literature”; R. McLeman and B. Smit, ‘‘Migration as an
Adaptation to Climate Change,” Climatic Change 76, no. Journal Article (2006); Laura
Hammond, ‘‘Family Ties.” Remittances and Livelihood Support in Puntland and
Somaliland,” (Nairobi, Kenya: FSNAU, 2013).
22 Anna Wetterberg, ‘‘Crisis, Social Ties, and Household Welfare: Testing Social
Capital Theory with Evidence from Indonesia,” (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005).
23 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘‘The Forms of Capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.) (New York,
Greenwood), 241–258.,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of
Education, ed. J. Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 986). p. 248.vance of these capital to the individual’s context. Coleman on the
other hand, asserted that the definition of social capital lies more
in the function it is able to perform: ‘‘It is not a single entity but a
variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they
all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate cer-
tain actions of actors. . . within the structure.”24 For Coleman, social
capital was a public good, not just confined to be an individual
resource. Putnam built on Coleman’s approach to emphasize the
public good nature of social capital and defined it as a community-
level attribute. According to Putnam, ‘‘social capital is the ‘feature
of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordination
actions.’”25
Social capital has frequently been broken down into three
dimensions.26 Bonding social capital refers to bonds between people
to whom Putnam refers as ‘‘homogenous” community members and
involves principles and norms such as trust, reciprocity, and cooper-
ation.27 These horizontal ties exist between similar individuals
resulting in a strong sense of belonging—to a group, tribal unit, or
nation. They can also represent indifference or even hostility, esca-
lating to deliberate polarization, isolation, or even violence towards
non-members.28 Bridging social capital links members of one group
to another across, for example, ethnic or racial lines, geographic
boundaries, and language groups.29 In turn, bridging social capital
helps foster connections to external assets and different social or eco-
nomic identities. These linkages can foster community resilience,
drawing on them when local resources are depleted or scarce.
Finally, linking social capital refers to ‘‘networks of trusting relation-
ships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal, or
institutionalized power or authority gradients in society.”30 Bonding
and bridging social capital usually refer to connections between
individuals of similar status; linking social capital, on the other hand,
takes into account the ‘‘vertical distance” of individuals’ varying
positions of authority.31
These forms of social ‘‘capital” have been cast as central factors
in the ability to respond to shocks; they have been identified as a
vital component of risk-smoothing and risk-sharing practices to
help individuals, households, and communities react to and
recover from disasters.32 Social capital is frequently presented as a
public good—a resource that provides non-excludable benefits to
those in the group. However, numerous examples show that social
capital may be both a public and quasi-private good; that is to say,
benefits do not affect individuals and/or groups in the same way.33
Benefits may be redeemed at the expense of outsiders. Indeed,
gender, wealth, and other power relations shape social networks.3424 James Coleman, ‘‘Social Capital in the Creation of Humanitarian Capital. 94, Suppl.
Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis
of Social Structure, S95-S120,” American Journal of Sociology 94, no. Supplement
(1988). P. S98.
25 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). (Putnam, 1993, p.167).
26 Daniel Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012).
27 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
28 Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery.
29 Ibid.
30 Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock, ‘‘Health by Association? Social Capital,
Social Theory, and the Political Economy of Public Health,” International Journal of
Epidemiology 33, no. 4 (2004). p. 655.
31 Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery. p. 33.
32 Quinn Bernier and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, ‘‘Resilience and Social Capital” in 2020
Conference Paper 4 (Washington DC: IFPRI, 2014).
33 W. Neil Adger, ‘‘Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate
Change,” Economic Geography 79, no. 387–404 (2003).
34 Bernier and Meinzen-Dick, ‘‘Resilience and Social Capital”.
39 UNDP, ‘‘Human Development Report: Somalia” (Nairobi/New York: UN Develop-
ment Programme, 2001).
40 Corbett, ‘‘Famine and Household Coping Strategies.” Davies, Adaptable Livelihoods.
Coping with Food Insecurity in the Malian Sahel.
41 The resilience literature in general, and on Somalia has grown rapidly since the
66 D. Maxwell et al. / Food Policy 65 (2016) 63–73Furthermore, these ties are not static over time but change through
people’s lives and between generations, and may fade as well as be
renewed.35
Several issues arise from the existing research that are worth
noting. First, the notion of social ‘‘capital” suggests something
directly fungible that could be counted, saved up, or called in; eco-
nomic rather than social aspects are usually emphasized. Second,
the tendency is to emphasize the positive aspects of social connec-
tions or social capital. Much of the literature ignores the way in
which ‘‘social capital” can also be used for exclusionary or exploita-
tive purposes, and downplays the extent to which trust can break
down and potential support from social networks can fluctuate
over time. Third, the literature on coping strategies notes specific
behaviors such as borrowing money or food, or purchasing food
on credit—which obviously depend on the social linkages of the
household. Indeed, migration strategies, labor-sharing arrange-
ments and risk sharing groups (such as funeral societies) all
depend on the social connections of households and individuals.
But beyond that, little detail has been noted on the specific link-
ages between social connectedness and coping. And fourth, while
the literature on coping notes a hierarchy of behaviors that implies
increasing severity (even while noting the context specificity of
such hierarchies), there is little research on the extent to which
the nature of connectedness may vary between ‘‘normal” times
and times of increasing hardship. The research outlined below
notes how this can work both ways; in hard times, social connec-
tions may be strengthened, but the functions of social networks
may also break down.
2.3. Lineage, social relations and famine
The single group that suffered the highest mortality in the 2011
famine was segregated by age, not social identity per se,10 with
children under the age of five being the worst affected. However,
the evidence is that the highest mortality from the famine was
among specific social groups, namely the Rahanweyn and the
Bantu/Jarer—the same groups as were hit hardest in the famine
of 1991/92 (Majid and McDowell, 2012). Research for this paper
was therefore designed with sensitivity to the potential for signif-
icantly different impact between different social groups or clans.
Somali society is described as a ‘‘segmented lineage” structure that
subdivides along its constituent branches from generation to gen-
eration, and claims a ‘‘total Somali genealogy.”36
As a resource sharing structure, Gardner and El Bushra describe
an extended family with members in rural, urban and diaspora
locations where income and other resources are shared across long
distances to maintain the integrity of the whole, extended family.37
However, this structure and its internal coherence as a resource
sharing system arguably represents the pastoral, ‘‘noble” clans most
closely (and can vary according to internal, social dynamics). The
Rahanweyn clan family have a lower social status than the ‘noble’
clans and have an agro-pastoral influenced livelihood and culture
(although on a spectrum from more pastoral to more sedentary
farming). The Somali Bantu or Jarer, are located outside the segmen-
tary lineage structure, and where the Rahanweyn have been
described as second class citizens the Jarer are described as third
class citizens.3835 Peggy Levitt and B. Nadya Jaworski. ‘‘Transnational Migration Studies: Past
Developments and Future Trends.” Annual Review of Sociology, 33: 129–156. (2007),
p. 137.
36 Lee Cassanelli, ‘‘Speculations on the Historical Origins of the ‘Total Somali
Genealogy’,” in Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics,
ed. Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst, 2009).
37 Gardner and El Bushra, Somalia - the Untold Story.
38 Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa,
African Issues (London: James Currey, 1997).This hierarchy in Somali society as well as the diversity of
resource options is embodied in the Somali diaspora. One in six
Somalis was estimated to be located in the diaspora over ten years
ago, with financial remittances accounting for the largest share of
the economy.39 The ‘‘noble” clans are predominant amongst the
diaspora for historical reasons. The evidence of the impact of remit-
tances on food security in the face of extreme crises has been lim-
ited, and in any case, the role of diaspora remittances only
partially captures of the notion of social connectedness.3. Coping with crisis and famine in Somalia
3.1. A typology of coping in Somalia
The term ‘‘coping” has come to mean many things: ‘‘Coping”
refers to relatively short-term changes in behavior to deal with a
setback—with varying degrees of reversibility in the individual
strategies employed; ‘‘adapting” refers to longer-term changes to
deal with a permanently changed context.40 These terms corre-
spond to categories in the contemporary literature on resilience:
‘‘Absorptive capacity” is about dealing with short-term setbacks
and ‘‘bouncing back” (‘‘coping” in earlier parlance). ‘‘Adaptive capac-
ity” is about dealing with longer-term changes, while protecting
future capacity (‘‘adapting” in earlier parlance). A third capacity,
‘‘transformative capacity” is about being able to proactively shape
that context.41
Table 1 depicts a typology of ‘‘coping strategies” that respon-
dents described in response to the famine of 2011. These can be
classified as strategies related to diversification (in terms of liveli-
hood strategies or assets, but more importantly diversification of
risk or exposure to hazards); flexibility (which includes mobility
in the case of livestock-dependent livelihoods; but also the ability
to exploit various opportunities); and social connectedness (the
strength of an individual or household’s social networks and the
ability to call upon others to help in the event of a shock). How
strategies play out, the order in which they are invoked, and their
long-term consequences vary by social group and geography.
These categories (diversification, flexibility, and connectedness)
also have gender dimensions. Changing roles of both women and
men, following the political and economic volatility of the last
two to three decades in Somalia, have led to women becoming
more active in economic pursuits. This is in part as a result of their
dual identities as wives and daughters (belonging to different fam-
ilies through birth and marriage), which enables them to cross clan
divides for political, social and economic purposes. 42 It is also due
to the necessity of earning income for the family. Women’s financial
contributions as remitters from the diaspora are contributing to
changing perceptions of gender roles.43 While women traditionally
had less mobility, very few women respondents reported limited
mobility as a constraint to coping with the famine of 2011. Somaliafamine. The most important conceptual work on this is, Christopher B. Barrett and
Mark A. Constas, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Resilience for International Development
Applications” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, no. 40 (2014). In
terms of programmatic applications, see, Tim Frankenberger et al., ‘‘Community
Resilience: Conceptual Framework and Measurement Feed the Future Learning
Agenda,” (Rockville, MD: USAID Feed the Future FEEDBACK Project, 2013).
42 Judith Gardner and Judith El Bushra, Somalia - the Untold Story, ed. Judith Gardner
and Judith El Bushra (London: CIIR and Pluto Press, 2004).
43 See Anna Lindley, ‘‘Migrant Remittances in the Context of Crisis in Somalia: A
case-study of Hargeisa.” Background Paper (London: Humanitarian Policy Group,
Overseas Development Institute, 2006).
Table 1
Typology of resilience and coping in the Somali famine.
Category Examples Level Application/severity
Diversification  Diversify livelihoods and assets
 Diversification of risk
 Diversify against drought risk (riverine
farming and/or camels)
 Have a foot in the urban economy
Individual/household
Some diversification within clan
or larger group
Mostly applies in the longer term and a means of
reducing risk, not as a means of coping with shocks
Flexibility  Physical mobility with livestock
 Labor mobility (employment)
 Exploit different opportunities (including
humanitarian aid)
 Outmigration as a last resort
Household
Community-level decisions
about when to move?
Limited ability to move condemned some small-
scale livestock holders, but others suffered large
losses far from home
Social ‘‘connectedness”  Forms of mutual support
 Usual: remittances; unusual: diaspora or
urban contacts, etc.
 Having ‘‘someone to cry to”; three overlap-
ping circles model
‘‘Second circle” community
level/clan level
Partly business level
Diaspora remittances stepped up in famine:
food, water trucking
Third circle as ‘‘system failure”
Political power  Access to/control over aid Household
Community
Gatekeepers from powerful clans in IDP settings
Crisis asset protection  Sharing food or assets with livestock
 Buying water for livestock
 Moving livestock in search of grazing and
water
 Leaving someone behind to protect land if
migrating
 Decision making about when to sell ani-
mals, when to move, etc.
Household
Community
Feeding cattle thatch from roofs during
drought
Timing of livestock sales
Out-migration usually as a last resort
Asset sales or depletion  Sale of livestock
 Sale of other productive assets
 Land pledging or mortgaging
Household
Community
Rapid livelihood
adaptation
 Renting farmland (esp. riverine) to protect
animals (access water/fodder)
 Sharing lactating animals—move with non-
lactating animals
 Natural resource extraction: firewood, char-
coal, thatch grass
 Search for casual wage employment
Household or inter-household
Wage labor in community as
form of social reciprocity albeit
a form of exchange
Some of these are ‘‘normal” livelihoods for poor
people, others are coping strategies in crisis
Credit  Use of savings/borrowing/debt
 Borrowing/purchase on credit as one form
of social connectedness
Household
Business
Social networks portrayed in positive light; can
lead to long-term indebtedness
Consumption strategies  Changing diets
 Borrowing food or money
 Rationing strategies
 Going hungry
Household and inter-
household
demographic
strategies
 Family splitting—both consumption- mini-
mization strategy and resource-acquisition
maximization strategy
 Opportunistic access to aid
resources/household splitting
 Labor-sharing
Household
Inter-household/community
Data: Field Interviews 2012–14.
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are more complicated than often suggested.
3.2. Absorptive strategies and the role of social connectedness
Strategies noted in Table 1 are, for the most part, not unique to
Somalia. Most of them have been noted previously in highly risk-
prone areas of the Horn of Africa and elsewhere.44 However, in
the Somali context, social connectedness plays a particularly impor-
tant role. For much of Somali society, these networks are best under-
stood in terms of the norms of reciprocity and obligation that exist as
part of belonging to a particular clan-based identity group (though
agricultural labor groups, friends and other categories of connection
may also be important).
Having ‘‘someone to cry to.” A wide variety of respondents across
all the study areas used the language of having ‘‘someone to cry to”44 For example, see Jane Corbett, ‘‘Famine and Household Coping Strategies.”to refer to requesting assistance from someone else, where the per-
son to whom one could cry would typically, but not exclusively, be
a relative—hopefully one based in town or in the diaspora (there-
fore outside the immediately-affected rural economy). This general
observation is illustrated by the a quote from a Rahanweyn-Leysan
pastoralist:45 ‘‘People who have nobody to cry to, that is who don’t
have kinsmen to help, don’t have a son or a daughter in the towns or
out of the country to help. . . all such people have no coping capacity.
From our case, we were also affected very much in our village but the
number of people who died were not many.”46
Another quote comes from a displaced person in the Dollo Ado
refugee camp in Ethiopia, who stated that, ‘‘We had nobody to cry to
for any form of assistance and/or remittance.”45 The Leysan are one of the most pastoral and wealthy sub-clans of the Rahanweyn
with a small business community and a small but significant diaspora population.
46 Field Interview. 2013. See Interview 02-003, Majid et al., 2016.
47 Field interviews. 2013–14. See Majid et al., 2016 (for this point shall we just
reference the whole other paper?
48 One of our senior researchers described this phenomenon (in his own case) in
terms of beginning to receive phone calls from people he didn’t know, asking for
assistance. This began in about May 2011.
49 Field interviews. 2013–14; see Majid et al., 2016 for a selection.
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The value of having ‘‘someone to cry to”—having a social net-
work, particularly with members outside the rural economy—is
reinforced by the extent of the Somali diaspora. However, while
the strength of Somali social networks and a culture of sharing is
renowned, and is applicable to all Somalis, the quality of social
connectedness, in terms of links between rural, urban and diaspora
locations and the availability of resources at these different loca-
tions, is markedly different between different groups. In particular,
those social groups most dependent on the rural economy with
fewest relatives and clan-members outside of these areas were
most vulnerable in 2011.
During the famine, parallel but distinctly different kinds of link-
ages were invoked to cope with the increasingly difficult circum-
stances. These linkages function to varying degrees during less
fraught times, but were clearly invoked during the famine. They
can best be described as three overlapping circles.
The first circle regards immediate kin relations—within the
immediate family or among very close relatives. This is where
much of the regular remittance activities take place. If a household
had connections to someone in the diaspora, or even someone
employed in the urban sector who was therefore less subject to
the dynamics of the crisis, then that household was likely to sur-
vive the famine—regardless of the short-term impacts to their
own livelihoods. They could call upon regular outside assistance.
On the other hand, in the absence of such linkages—or if the link-
ages broke down because the remitting individual or household
also faced the same set of risks—then connectedness defaulted to
the second circle. The first circle is relatively ‘‘fixed.”
The second circle is more fluid, and consists broadly of extended
family, sub-clan or lineage and community linkages. These link-
ages overlap with the first circle but also extend well beyond it.
Nevertheless, the second circle is also based on ‘‘face-to-face” rela-
tions—people who actually know and regularly interact with each
other (they do not have to be in physical proximity given the near
ubiquity of telephone-based contact), or at least within social cir-
cles that are strongly maintained. This second circle does not nec-
essarily provide a regular source of income or assistance, but in the
face of the rapidly worsening conditions in 2011, there was wide-
spread mobilization of this circle; people were called upon to share
what they could of their own resources with other members of this
circle.
The second circle would be described in contemporary termi-
nology as ‘‘community absorptive capacity” and it defines how
much of a shock the broader group or network can take before
its resource pool collapses. Thus, the ‘‘absorptive capacity” of a
given household cannot be adequately defined or analyzed without
reference to both the first and second circles described here. While
the first circle is difficult to measure accurately, the second circle is
even more so. It might not be invoked until a crisis hits, and some
of the other members of the circle may be affected by the same cri-
sis. Thus, the ability to call on this second circle, and critically, the
diversity and depth of resources that flowed in this circle, seemed
to be the critical factors in how well a household weathered the
famine. While the structure of the social network might remain
the same in a crisis, the resource flow within the network varied,
and in some cases declined rapidly.
The extent to which this actually occurred depended on the
level of diversification of resources and risk in this second circle.
Where most members of the network are in the rural economy—
and therefore subject to the same shocks—resources can diminish
very quickly. However, where a significant part of the network is
located outside the rural economy, the resources within this sec-
ond circle may be able to mitigate the shock. And the second circle
is about resource-sharing in some manner or other: it could beabout zakat; it could be about extending credit (from a shopkeeper
or a relative/clan mate) when a household cannot pay cash; and it
could be about directly sharing money or other resources. 47
Thus, it is critical to understand who is in and who is out of
which circles (even within a clan or lineage-based grouping); the
kind of resources circulating in the circle; the extent of these
resources; and the diversity of resources and linkages within the
‘‘circle” or network. And though it played a critical role in protect-
ing households that did not have regular remittance income, this
second circle was already weakened by a variety of factors before
the famine hit: Al-Shabaab was claiming zakat resources for its
own use—taking it out of this circle; Some wealthier or better-
connected people had moved out of their communities because
of Al-Shabaab taxation and harassment, weakening the resource-
base. At a certain point in the crisis, this second circle collapsed
in certain areas and for certain social groups, and when it did, it
collapsed suddenly and left little in the way of a safety net. Some
groups, especially those who had more diversified social networks,
sought to mobilize higher levels of the clan when the second circle
collapsed.
The third circle was much more distant and was comprised of
people that one might not know, or where there may not have
been a common clan identity. An individual searching to try to find
someone—no matter how distant—was heavily reported after
about May 2011. This might be an acquaintance, a distant relative,
or ‘‘big people.” However this might also apply to the highest func-
tional levels of the lineage system. However, this level of the clan/
lineage is rarely invoked; it is most commonly sought only in times
of large-scale conflict. This third circle is less predicated on face-to-
face relations, but rather on more distant claims—usually to a com-
mon clan-based identity. This third circle does not function at all in
‘‘normal” times, and only in the face of major conflict or crisis in
the case of the clan system. Some individuals and some clans were
able to find assistance through this circle, but many were not—and
those that were excluded fell into famine conditions. This circle
came to include a wider sense of Somali solidarity, whereby many
diaspora groups were mobilized to contribute to mosques, Somali
NGOs, and in some cases invented their own humanitarian
projects.
Each of these circles also invokes the issues of mobility and
diversification, as well as the resources that flow within each of
the circles. The second circle clearly exists first and foremost to
help individuals or households cope with an idiosyncratic
shock—which affect only a few members of the network. A covari-
ate shock—or a combination of covariate shocks such as occurred
in 2010–11—eventually undermines the viability of the second cir-
cle because the resources that circulate in this circle are finite and
cannot be replenished. Analytically, the collapse of the second cir-
cle as described here signified the onset of famine conditions in
2011. The collapse of this circle was sudden, and in many cases
not easily predictable. But this collapse was indicated by individu-
als or households beginning to assert claims in the third circle.48
This began in May or early June of 2011 (some six to eight weeks
before the formal declaration of famine).49 If one were to propose
an ‘‘emic” definition for the declaration of a famine in Somalia, this
would almost certainly be it. However, the collapsing of the second
level resulted in the mobilization of the third circle, which for some
clans averted a collapse into famine. Illustrations of the different
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examples.
3.4. Differing impacts of social connectedness
The ability to call upon extended family and clan members,
located in and outside of the country, in order to mitigate the
impact of the worsening crisis, was a recurring theme in the inter-
views, but the extent to which this was possible varied greatly;
clans or social groups with a longer history of migration, education,
urbanization and emigration ultimately have more members
located outside of the rural economy, and these characteristics
are more prevalent for the ‘‘noble” clans than for the Rahanweyn
and the Bantu/Jarer. There are nevertheless considerable variations
in this feature even within the ‘‘noble” clans and there are similar
hierarchies within the Rahanweyn (as with the Leysan quote).
This phenomenon was most evident in Central regions where
(a) the crisis conditions in early 2011 were extremely serious
and (b) the mobilization of social networks was intensive and
extensive. Respondents from Central regions (and members inter-
viewed in Nairobi and the diaspora) reported how their pastoral
kin moved to urban relatives in the small towns of the central
regions as the crisis deepened, being absorbed into their extended
families (the second circle). However these relatives reportedly
could not manage the demands on their resources and called for
further help from their Mogadishu and Nairobi-based relatives as
well as more distant diaspora relatives. Even respondents in the
UK recalled how they organized themselves to raise money when
they realized how serious the situation was. A respondent from
the UK diaspora stated that:
‘‘The clan members in Mogadishu responded well. I know one man
who donated US $200,000 in one go. Many others were similar in
generosity. The members in Mogadishu also contacted the diaspora
members of the clan who in three months collected and sent more
than US $1 million. The death rate started reducing and the deaths
stopped all together before the rains started”50In this case, the second circle helped to stem the tide of the cri-
sis, but it was only the third circle that had sufficient resources to
contain the deteriorating situation. In contrast, a pastoral clan from
Lower Shabelle (the Jiddo, from the Rahanweyn clan), were not
able to respond as above. The Jiddo were known as a relatively
wealthy sub-clan, owning large numbers of cattle and living in
the lower reaches of the Shabelle River, benefiting from the delta
formed at its end. In 2011, the river dried up in these lower
reaches—an almost unprecedented event that ultimately led to
very large numbers of cattle being lost. Many Jiddo become desti-
tute with one respondent described the following:
‘‘We just kept hoping that it will rain and things will change. Noth-
ing changed and it didn’t rain until the last of my cows died. I had
three children then and my wife. We came to Qorioley town. We
did not have enough money to pay for the fares to Mogadishu. I
had relatives in Qorioley but they were supporting so many other
people”5152 It is not only having a diaspora, but where they are located and in what
employment status that is important; the Saudi Arabian diaspora mentioned may not
be able to raise the same funds as an equivalent number in Europe or the USA for
example. See Interview 04-005, Majid et al., 2016.
53 Field Interview. 2014. See Interview 01-005, Majid et al., 2016.
54In this case, a clan with significant cattle wealth did not have
enough members or resources outside the rural cattle economy
to provide much assistance, and while resources were shared, the
rapid depletion of wealth in the second circle (cattle), the situation
quickly overwhelmed the ability for mutual assistance. A Jiddo
elder in the UK explained it in following way:50 Field Interview. 2013. See Interview 01-005, Majid et al., 2016.
51 Field Interview. 2012.
Per
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Bris‘‘The Jiddo diaspora community is very small in comparison with
other Somali clans. There are 20 in USA, 5 in Australia, 500–1000
in Saudi Arabia, 3 in the UK. In addition the Jiddo do not have busi-
ness or trading culture and hence do not have big businessmen who
could support them in hard times.”523.5. The limits of social connectedness
While social connectedness is a critical factor in people’s ability
to cope with crisis, various nuances influence the effectiveness of
that coping. The fact of having social links to relatives in distant
locations did not automatically lead to a timely response. Many
respondents knew they had distant relatives abroad but were not
in regular contact and did not call upon their assistance when
times got much harder. In other cases, distant relatives were only
fully engaged much later in the crisis and then started to provide
financial assistance to help families recover (rather than mitigate
the impact of the disaster at the time). In other words, social ties
were renewed through the disaster. One respondent explained in
the following terms:
‘‘At first when people were calling me I thought it was the usual
calls that I used to receive as people always tell us stories to get
money. Then we realized there was a problem later. It took time
to mobilize people. It also took time to convince Al-Shabaab to let
us help our people. All this contributed to the delay. It is also the
case that many nomads put all their efforts in saving their animals
and had not much time in soliciting money from relatives until
their children were too weak.”53
In other words, even being a member of a wealthy, diversified
clan does not guarantee the avoidance of extreme suffering in
times of crisis. Those who send frequent financial remittances suf-
fer a form of ‘‘fatigue,” and it can take time to organize kin to
respond. The strain on those sending money acts to qualify the
reification of social ties and North to South remittance flows, that
neglect the often precarious financial context of immigrants in
their host countries, a condition their own relatives back home
often do not fully appreciate.54 There is frequently a tension around
the trust in or strength of social ties—that people ‘‘tell us stories to
get money.” This is akin to the notion of ‘‘crying wolf” weakening
trust in these social networks.55
4. Social ‘‘capital? or social exclusion and predation?
The hierarchies within Somali society have already been noted,
with the Rahanweyn and the Bantu/Jarer occupying a lower status.
These two groups were also provided the majority of the displaced
populations, as refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya and within Somalia.
This was especially the case in Mogadishu, where control of the
vast majority of the humanitarian resources, the district commis-
sioners, NGO staff and camp managers, tended to belong to the
dominant clan of Mogadishu (the Hawiye). Significant amounts
of humanitarian resources were claimed, diverted and/or sold by
these various ‘‘gate-keepers”—an individual or group who control
access to resources—at the expense of extremely impoverished,Lindley, ‘‘The Early Morning Phone Call: Remittances from a Refugee Diaspora
spective.” Working Paper No. 47.
Nisar Majid, ‘‘Livelihoods, Development and the Somali Diaspora” (University of
tol, 2013).
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Somali Bantu person, the second from a Rahanweyn, illustrate the
story:
‘‘We reached Mogadishu. For almost ten days we were depending
on begging in the streets with our children because there was no
aid. It was around late May to early June 2011 that we were taken
to one of the Mogadishu IDP camps. They bring food every day but
after taking photos the food is taken back from all the people and
only 20 percent given to us. Some business people and the owner
of the camp, plus the NGO staff are taking the food. We can’t com-
plain because they will chase us from the camp. Sometimes the
militia are coming at night taking the few things left and raping
girls and women.”57‘‘Some days people tell me that some people were given cards to get
rations of food but this was done in the night and they gave these
cards to their own clans, friends, and acquaintances. I was not a
friend or a member of their clan so we were never given a card
but we were okay as long as we got something to eat every day.
I stayed in these IDP camps for two years during which I saw many
tragedies and acts of crime. We were very hungry most of the time.
Many children died of malnutrition and diseases such as cholera. I
have seen youths from established communities in Mogadishu
come into the camps almost every night and rob these IDPs of
the few things they had and rape woman with impunity.”58
The exploitation of the famine-displaced reflects not only out-
right criminality and corruption but also demonstrated the way
in which clan identities and power differentiate segments of
Somali society and work to exclude and deprive certain groups
from access to resources—even to the point of starvation. Men-
khaus argued that negotiations with such gatekeepers were as
important as those with Al-Shabaab in terms of enabling access,
and extremely problematic in both cases.59 This control over aid
resources by the dominant resident clan also applies in other dis-
placed contexts and was noted, for example, in Dadaab refugee camp
in Kenya, during the same study.
In summary, historical processes of marginalization have meant
that a long-standing hierarchy within Somali society exists
between clan families as well as within them, which today distin-
guishes those that are more able to contain large-scale (covariate)
shocks through their own networked resources from those that are
less able to. This underlying vulnerability is exacerbated in times of
crisis and humanitarian response, because control of that response
is strongly influenced by the more powerful clans (whether indi-
vidually or collectively).
5. Discussion: Famine, coping, and social connectedness
The coping mechanisms outlined in Table 1 would be broadly
familiar in any analysis of livelihood activities in a chronically at-
risk or crisis-affected area. In the Somalia case, these emphasize
diversification and flexibility as well as social connectedness. The
cases explored here show that these are characteristics not only
of individual or household strategies, but also of social networks.
The more flexible or diversified such networks are—in addition to
the wealth of network members—the better the chances of individ-
ual members’ survival in and recovery from major shocks like the
2011 famine. Diversification here refers more to diversification of56 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Hostages of the Gatekeepers: Abuses against Internally
Displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013).
57 Field Interview. 2014 Interview 02-004, Majid et al., 2016.
58 Field Interview. 2013. Interview 04-002, Majid et al., 2016.
59 Ken Menkhaus, ‘‘No Access: Critical Bottlenecks in the 2011 Somali Famine,”
Global Food Security 1, no. 1 (2012).risk than to the usual categories of assets and income streams at
the level of both the individual or household and the network.
Table 1 also emphasizes political power and the differential access
that groups have to formal assistance—or the capture of aid.
5.1. Common themes: social connections and remittances
Much has been written (and speculated about) regarding the
role of the diaspora and remittance income in Somalia, and though
it has been exhaustively described, it has been stubbornly difficult
to quantify at the household level. Questions have lingered about
the way in which remittance dynamics change in response to
crises. A common theme in individual and household responses
was that membership in these networks tends to be stable, and
resource flows might remain relatively fixed even in a crisis—de-
scribed above as the ‘‘first circle” of social connectedness. Regular
remittance income tended to continue as long as the remitter
was not subject to the same hazards as the recipient (hence the
importance of diversification of risk within the social network)—
and may well increase as the recipient supports more people. But
some social dynamics definitely do change in response to worsen-
ing conditions (particularly those described here as the ‘‘second
circle”), and some of these changes may signify the collapse of cop-
ing or even the collapse in the ability of existing social networks to
support members. In many ways, therefore, this ‘‘second circle” as
described above is of critical importance to coping and survival.
However, some clans were able to effectively mobilize resources
within the third circle—at increasingly ‘‘distant” levels of the clan
or even beyond clan connections.
Thus the factors that strengthen or weaken the second circle—
and how these factors may differ among different group—are
important to understand. Notions of diversification and flexibility
are as important at the level of the social network as they are at
the individual or household level—indeed the former goes a long
ways towards defining the latter. Under these conditions, it is
really not possible to talk about the characteristics and coping
capacity of any individual or household—particularly in the context
of a major shock—without understanding the characteristics of the
social group or network of the individual or household. Some
groups were very hard hit by the crisis but were able to cope—or
at least survive; others became destitute and/or suffered high
levels of mortality
Much was made of howmuch time the mobilization of an inter-
national response took in the face of worsening conditions in the
first half of 2011, but these cases also show that organizing an
extraordinary response through social networks also took some
time—and that to some degree the extraordinary measures
described here developed only in response to extraordinary levels
of suffering.
Though some superficial similarities may occur, the three ‘‘cir-
cles” that emerge from the analysis of these interviews from the
Somalia famine are not the same as the categories of ‘‘bonding,
bridging, and linking” social capital.” The first two circles could
be described as a form of ‘‘bonding,” but such a label doesn’t really
clarify anything about the dynamics. The third circle can also be
understood as a form of bonding, through common identity, but
at a distance that is relatively rarely invoked. Transformational
changes in communications and transportation—even from the
most remote locations in Somalia to the far corners of the
globe—have enabled these linkages and probably blurred any ana-
lytically useful distinction between ‘‘bonding” and ‘‘bridging.” In
Somalia today, you might be ‘‘closer” to someone in the UK or
the Middle East than to someone in the next village: face-to-face
relations no longer require physical proximity. Examples of indi-
vidual assisting people from other clans—which might be taken
as an example of ‘‘bridging”—still relied on face-to-face relation-
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‘‘clan” and ‘‘sub-clan” are extremely important social categories to
understand in Somalia, they do not define the sum total of social
relations.
An example of ‘‘linking” social connection—not particularly
highlighted in this paper, but certainly part of the overall dynamics
of the famine and its response—involved Islamic charity networks
and provided assistance through mosques or local organizations by
linking them to external sources of money or material aid.60
More importantly, the relationship between the first and second
circles is temporal and related to the ways in which shocks are
managed. In the absence of a crisis, the second circle may not be
active, or its primary function is to respond to idiosyncratic shocks.
It is also maintained in ways other than the flow of money or other
resources that affect some members of the network but not all of
them. It may expand in unusual ways in the face of extraordinary
covariate shocks such as those faced in Somalia in 2011. And for
some at least, the second circle ultimately collapsed, triggering
widespread stress migration and high levels of human mortality.
The third circle was invoked in response to the collapse or severe
stressing of the second, and even though it may have involved
the search for more distant and better-off connections, it does
not correspond directly to the notion of ‘‘linking.”
These ‘‘circles” define who is in what network and the temporal
way in which different networks are invoked. They do not, in
themselves, map resource flows or other elements of what might
be considered social capital. That requires additional work, and
while this is relatively straightforward to describe, it is very diffi-
cult to quantify. But it is impossible to understand and differentiate
between the coping ability of different groups without understand-
ing these dynamics—even if they are only poorly quantified.
5.2. Common themes: social exclusion and predation
Sometimes these relations are as much about exclusion and
exploitation as about inclusion and mutual coping. Some groups
have been better able to capture external aid just as some groups
have a bigger and better educated business community or dias-
pora—indeed the two often go hand in hand. The issue of gatekeep-
ers and aid ‘‘capture” do not fit comfortably within the relatively
cheerful categories of ‘‘social capital.” Yet clearly people relied on
their social connections and identity and their links with clan mili-
tias to gain control over aid—sometimes through ‘‘aid baiting” or
the use of human famine victims to attract humanitarian assis-
tance with the intent to steal or otherwise exploit that aid for their
own benefit—or that of their own social networks. Thus social rela-
tions and social connectedness can be as much about exclusion as
inclusion; as much about victimization and exploitation as about
mutual assistance and coping.
5.3. Conclusion and implications
Understanding social connectedness is clearly critical for under-
standing how different groups coped with the famine—and with
crisis more generally: how badly people were affected by the same
levels of shock, whether they survived, and whether people were
able to recover or were left destitute. This connectedness takes
place alongside other, better-studied ‘‘coping” activities, such as
natural resource extraction, asset sales or rationing strategies.
But a bigger question lingers about the implications of this analysis60 For details on this, see Maxwell and Majid, Famine in Somalia: Competing
Imperatives, Collective Failures, 2012–2012. Respondents from these actors claimed
that, for the most part, they did not receive additional resources in 2011 until the
declaration of the famine and the global media coverage, in spite of trying to do so
earlier in recognition of the developing crisis.for formal policy and practice. In the aftermath of the famine and a
similar though somewhat less severe crisis in the Sahel in 2012,
much of the policy discourse has focused on the notion of building
the resilience of households, communities, and institutions so that
they themselves are better able to deal with shocks. The strength of
these networks is clearly a major factor that makes households and
communities more resilient. Beyond the resilience agenda, another
relevant theme is the trend towards localization of humanitarian
response and the emphasis on ‘‘providers of first resort,” who are
almost by definition people who are close by and who may be
affected to some degree by the same crisis. Strengthening the
capacity of local communities, local government, and local organi-
zations to respond quickly to shocks is increasingly an important
part of the discourse about humanitarian action.61 The analysis
here emphasizes the importance of social connectedness, but
whether and how social connectedness can be strengthened by
external intervention is not always clear.
It is clearly important to understand these dynamics. But it is
equally important to understand that these dynamics have their
own logic and rationale—they are not just a local response to exter-
nal policy. That said, this analysis has a number of important impli-
cations for policy and practice—framed here as working
hypotheses.
First, many groups were badly affected by the crisis of 2011, but
the dynamics analyzed here make it clear that some groups were
much better connected and much more able to cope with circum-
stances. By the same token, however, some groups were much bet-
ter able to capture formal humanitarian assistance—and indeed
this may be part of what enabled them to better withstand the
impact of the crisis. So the first working hypothesis is that under-
standing social connections has obvious implications for the tar-
geting of external humanitarian assistance. However, when
targeting has to overcome powerful social dynamics on the ground,
experience indicates that it can be extremely difficult to ensure
that the most vulnerable groups actually receive the assistance
that is allocated to them. External military intervention to ensure
that vulnerable groups received assistance backfired dramatically
in 1992. No such external intervention was tried in 2011. Indeed
in 2011, the external concern about the dynamics of aid capture
revolved around the question of whether diverted assistance
would fall into the hands of Al-Shabaab. Internally in Somalia, a
different set of concerns around aid-capture and constraints to
access was highlighted by Menkhaus and related, not to Al-
Shabaab, but to gatekeepers or ‘‘black cats.” He noted that ‘‘Al-
Shabaab could be cleared out of much of south Somalia but that
would not necessarily guarantee humanitarian access. . .”62
Beyond the issue of targeting is the interpretation of crisis
dynamics. As noted, until the time of the famine declaration in July,
the situation depicted by the most up to date analysis suggested
that the crisis was the worst in central Somalia, but then suddenly
famine conditions were found in Bay, Bakool, Lower and Middle
Shabelle (which earlier analysis showed to be affected, but not as
badly). Much of the speculation since has centered on the question
of ‘‘what went wrong?” with the analysis of deteriorating condi-
tions in the latter regions. The analysis here suggests a second
working hypothesis that the missing element may have been the
lack of an understanding of the social connections of affected
groups in both areas—that in fact affected groups in the central
regions were better connected, with relatively higher proportions
of their populations in urban and diaspora locations and more able
to cope, even though the conditions might have been as bad or
worse there in the early months of 2011 as they were farther to61 See for example, much of the preparatory analysis for the World Humanitarian
Summit to be held in Istanbul in May 2016.
62 Menkhaus, ‘‘No Access: Critical Bottlenecks in the 2011 Somali Famine.” p. 34.
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the observed current status reports in 2011 and the information on
social connectedness as reported here, it is hypothesized—not con-
firmed—as the explanation.
The persisting question arising is out of this analysis is whether
social connectedness can be bolstered through external interven-
tion to improve ‘‘community absorptive capacity.” In the aftermath
of the crisis, attempts are being made to strengthen local early
warning, and to build community contingency funds, capitalized
by joint investment from external and community sources. These
efforts go beyond simply improving livelihoods assets or diversify-
ing income streams, and are attempts to strengthen the role of
‘‘responders of first resort.” For the most part it is too early to judge
the success of these interventions. However, engaging in complex,
contested social contexts is extremely difficult, especially for
humanitarian actors whose focus is typically on delivery. So a third
working hypothesis is understanding these dynamics is critical, but
not something that one does overnight or in the context of ‘‘rapid
assessment.” The analysis here has important implications about
mechanisms to ensure equal access to such resources, and also
for the targeting of interventions to improve these capacities. For
the most part, however, targeting of interventions in the post-
famine period is still being managed in such a way as to minimize
the likelihood that Al-Shabaab might benefit from diverted aid. In
other words, aid is being allocated according to risk criteria, not
need—so in fact many of the areas most affected by the famine
are not included in these interventions.
On the other hand, while proactively intervening on the basis of
the analysis here may not be straightforward, it is quite clear that
any attempt to bolster resilience in Somalia should seek to avoid
undermining the very strategies on which Somali communities
rely. So the 4th working hypothesis is that attempts to isolate
Somali money transfer companies from international banking sys-
tems (again, in the name of counter-terrorism) undermine the resi-
lience of Somali communities where the international transfer of
money is an important part of daily life and the response to crisis
conditions.63 It makes no sense for external actors to try to ‘‘build
resilience” while at the same time self-evidently undermining it.
Finally, measuring social connectedness presents substantial
methodological problems. The analysis here was based on two
years of fieldwork, mostly conducted retrospectively after the fam-
ine had ended. But this analysis suggests that the way social net-
works function in extremis is qualitatively different from the way
they function under more ‘‘normal” circumstances—and the moni-
toring of these changes could be a very important kind of informa-
tion for early warning and response. Certainly understanding and
predicting the collapse of networks of support is critical. Monitor-
ing the kinds of information presented here is possible but require
different monitoring protocols than those currently used. And
framing social connectedness in terms of clan or social identity is
highly political, and an area that most conventional information
systems avoid. Solid knowledge about livelihood patterns and geo-
graphic locations of different groups can help to depoliticize the
analysis, but in situation of rapid population displacement, these
can shift quickly, whereas social identity remains constant.
Nevertheless, understanding the capacity of households and
communities to cope with deteriorating circumstances is critical
to both analysis of and intervention in future crises. This analysis
has highlighted both the necessity and the complexity of under-
standing social connectedness in the Somalia context. While63 The most flagrant example of this was the pressure from the UK government for
Barclay’s Bank to close the account of Dahabshiil (the largest of the money transfer
companies) at the same that it was investing millions of Pounds Sterling in
‘‘resilience” programming in Somalia. BBC 2013: http://www.bbc.com/news/busi-
ness-23030943.understanding social identity in all its complexity is critical, to a
large degree during the famine, the social category that most
defined the ability to survive was described in terms of lineage
and clan, but under extreme circumstances may go beyond these
categories. The extent to which these connections can be under-
stood and mapped will provide a deeper understanding of resili-
ence in Somalia, and therefore an important component of
preventing future famines.Acknowledgements
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